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Abstract
Cognitive architectures are generally considered to be theo-
ries of the innate capabilities of the (human) cognitive system.
Any knowledge that is not innate is encoded in the architec-
tures memory systems, either by the modeler or learned by
the architecture itself. However, in human intelligent behav-
ior few things are innate. An alternative is to acknowledge
that learning occurs at different levels of abstraction. A stan-
dard model of the mind should therefore span multiple levels
of abstraction, encouraging research efforts to establish learn-
ing mechanism that connect them.
Human babies are born almost completely helpless. Al-
though developmental psychology has a lot to say about
what newborns are already capable of, they acquire almost
everything they need to know at some stage in life. This
is why the human species is so successful: it can adapt
to many different circumstances, and is therefore, with the
same genome, successful in current day’s society just as well
as, say, the time that we were still hunter-gatherers.
Piaget (1952) argued that child development goes through
a number of stages, starting with a sensorimotor stage, and
progressing to more cognitive and abstract stages with age.
Even though developmental psychologists still debate the
existence of concrete stages, it is clear that learning in an
infant is quite different from learning in an adult.
Current cognitive architectures, such as ACT-R (Ander-
son 2007), Soar (Laird, Newell, and Rosenbloom 1987) and
PRIMs (Taatgen 2013), have a somewhat more simple view
of development. The assumption is that the cognitive archi-
tecture represents the innate cognitive capabilities of intel-
ligence, and that everything that is learned is represented
as knowledge and skills in the memory systems of the ar-
chitecture (Laird, Lebiere, and Rosenbloom in press). This
may seem a reasonable assumption, but it carries along a
big problem. Whenever we want to create a model of a spe-
ciﬁc task, we have to encode the knowledge to perform that
task in terms of knowledge in the memory of the architec-
ture. However, the architecture’s memory is empty, which
means that there is a gap between what the architecture can
do by itself, and the requirements of the task. The modeler
has to ﬁll this gap with ad hoc solutions that are probably
not completely justiﬁed, but that help to achieve the par-
ticular goal of modeling the particular task. However, this
approach means that many models, even within the same
architecture, are completely incompatible with one another.
Therefore, it has the danger that it runs into the same prob-
lem that Newell (1973) signaled in psychology in general:
that it produces a collection of micro-theories for speciﬁc
phenomena, but that it fails to achieve a uniﬁed theory of
cognition. Moreover, certain domains that are relatively late
in development, such as language and social cognition, are
very hard to model in an architecture where knowledge starts
from scratch, because they require large amounts of prereq-
uisite knowledge. If cognitive architectures want to break
new grounds, they have to acknowledge this problem, and
look for new solutions.
Horizontal vs. Multilevel Architectures
Newell (1973) identiﬁed multiple levels of abstraction to
study human cognition, ranging from the level of organelles
that operate in the 100 μs time range to social cognition that
operates at a time scale of months. What Newell considered
the levels that are most interesting for cognition are in be-
tween these extremes: the level of deliberate acts (100 ms),
operations (1 sec), and unit tasks (10 sec). It is tempting, and
consistent with ideas that go back to Turing (1950), to pick a
level of abstraction as the base level to model human cogni-
tion, consider all levels below that level as implementation,
and build up the theory from that level. I call this a hori-
zontal architecture, because it focusses on a single level of
abstraction as a starting point both up and down (Figure 1).
The developmental literature suggests another approach, in
which we take into account that learning takes place at each
level of abstraction. I call this a multilevel architecture. The
central idea in the multilevel architecture is that there is not
a particular level of abstraction that is “special”. Depend-
ing on the phenomenon we want to model, we have to se-
lect one or more levels of abstraction that are most appropri-
ate. Therefore, the neural level is not the most appropriate to
model learning the past tense (Taatgen and Anderson 2002),
and object recognition is hard to model at a symbolic level.
Multiple Levels of Learning
Human learning can takes many different forms. If students
are cramming for an exam, trying to force facts into their
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Figure 1: Horizontal vs. Multilevel architectures. In the mul-
tilevel architecture, composition takes units from a lower
level to compose new units at the higher level, while eval-
uation processes prioritize units within a level.
memories, they are doing something different then when
they practice solving equations. Children learning their na-
tive language seem to be able to acquire it by mere exposure,
whereas learning a second language requires a more explicit
learning effort. Cells in the visual cortex learn to detect par-
ticular patterns of light, eventually enabling use to recog-
nize complex objects. In order to explain different types of
learning, we often need different mechanisms, ranging from
associative learning, reward-driven learning, example-based
learning to explicit reasoning. Interestingly enough, these
learning mechanisms also play out at different time scales.
In particular learning mechanisms that are related to neural
networks require huge numbers of training cycles, whereas
explicit reasoning may produce ”one-shot” learning, where
only a single exposure is enough to learn something new.
How many learning mechanisms do we need in a cog-
nitive architecture? If we take the horizontal approach, we
have to try to capture all learning with as few mechanisms
as possible. The more mechanisms for learning we have, the
more difﬁcult it becomes to determine what mechanisms of
learning should be used in what situation. For example, in
ACT-R there are several experimental results that can be ex-
plained by both procedural (utility) learning as by declara-
tive (instance-based) learning.
The different time scales that learning mechanisms op-
erate at are a clue that we are dealing with different levels
of abstraction, but now in a reverse order compared to time
time scale that they operate on: learning at the lowest lev-
els takes most time, whereas learning at the highest levels
can be ”one-shot”, so very fast. Also, learning follows a de-
velopmental trajectory in which learning starts at the lowest
levels of abstraction, and gradually builds up to the highest
(hence the staircase in Figure 1).
Learning in a multilevel architecture does not involve
reinventing the wheel, but putting different learning mech-
anisms in the right perspective. As Laird et al. (in press) in-
dicate, there are two categories of learning: composition and
tuning. When new knowledge is composed, we take multiple
elements that we combine into one new element. Although
this may happen within a level of abstraction, for exam-
ple when multiple pieces of declarative knowledge are con-
nected into a new declarative item, it may also mean that we
take multiple elements from a lower level and combine them
into a single unit at a higher level. In other words, the lower
level supplies the primitives for the the higher level. But
primitives are never “truly” primitive, because they them-
selves are rooted in even lower levels of abstraction. In the
case of tuning, knowledge items are evaluated, leading to de-
cisions on what to retain. The input for this tuning process
may be based on rewards or other local information, but also
on information that feeds back from higher levels.
Possible Levels and their Learning
Mechanisms
What are possible meaningful levels of abstraction? Al-
though I consider this an open question, there are a number
of likely candidates.
Neural and Clusters of Neurons Level
The neural level is an obvious level of abstraction, even
though there is debate about the right level of detail. Neu-
ral models can be very powerful, because they acquire all
their knowledge through learning, even though this learn-
ing is typically very slow. There are a number of attempts
to build a complete cognitive architecture based on neural
networks, and the programs in that direction aim at general-
purpose systems that have strong correspondences with tra-
ditional cognitive architectures (Stocco, Lebiere, and Ander-
son 2010; Eliasmith et al. 2012). Neural architectures use
clusters of neurons to represent knowledge, where particu-
lar patterns of activation represent certain concepts. Models
build within these architectures take a lot of time and in-
genuity, and large amounts of training, for relatively easy
tasks. For example, the model by Stocco requires an elabo-
rate neural network for aural-vocal choice reaction time task
that requires only a few production rules in ACT-R.
Although performance at the neural level is in terms of
milliseconds, learning is slow. Learning in neural networks
can be done unsupervised, in which the network has to dis-
cover meaningful patterns itself, or supervised, in which the
network is supplied with the correct answer. In this latter
case the question is what the source is of the correct answer.
477
Primitive Operations
If clusters of neurons represent concepts, we need methods
to do something with those representations. For example, a
standard neural network may take a visual image and turn
this in a motor command. This means that a pattern of acti-
vation is transformed and forwarded through several layers
of neurons in order to produce an output. If we want to gen-
eralize this to a more task-general approach, activation pat-
terns in the network have to routed through the network de-
pending on the particular task it carries out. We can specify
such routing patterns in terms of primitive operations. A sin-
gle primitive operation can compare patterns in two different
neural clusters, or forward information from one cluster to
another.
We can abstract from the neural implementation by as-
suming a symbolic representation of activation patterns.
Some details are lost in this abstraction, but the advantage
is that the symbolic implementation is much more efﬁcient.
Primitive operations are the smallest building blocks of the
PRIMs architecture (Taatgen 2013). If assume primitive op-
erations are the basic building blocks, we are hiding a nec-
essary learning process under the hood: activation patterns
for the same symbol are typically not identical between neu-
ronal clusters (e.g., the representation of a perceived table
may be different from the representation of a remembered
table), and therefore the network has to learn the mapping
between the two representations through associative learn-
ing.
Operators or Productions
Our cognition system is capable of doing many things in par-
allel, but constraints on the task, the structure of the brain or
the logic of the chosen strategy also force serial behavior.
At the operator (Soar or PRIMs terminology) or production
(ACT-R terminology) level, the smallest unit of knowledge
represents what can be carried out in parallel in one step. It is
also the level of abstraction that almost all (non-neural) cog-
nitive architectures operate at. A challenge for the horizon-
tal architecture that operates at this level is the question how
the operators and/or productions are learned. Both ACT-R
and Soar have solutions for this, but the problem is that they
are based on knowledge of the same level of abstraction:
in ACT-R, two productions rules are compiled into a sin-
gle one rule (Taatgen and Lee 2003), whereas in Soar new
productions and operators are learned through impasses that
have to be resolved by other productions and operators. As
a consequence, learning becomes an inﬁnite regression with
unknown origins.
However, ACT-R and Soar productions can be broken
down into primitive operations from the lower level of ab-
straction (Taatgen 2013; Stearns, Laird, and Assanie 2017)1.
This means that we can also see learning at this level as a
composition process of lower-level primitive operations.
1Note that the Soar implementation uses production rules and
operators at the same level of abstraction that are composed into
larger units. This raises an interesting issue whether each level of
abstraction should correspond to a level of implementation (as in
computer architecture), or just as a level description.
Goals
Goals represent the minimal groups of operators that to-
gether form a meaningful unit. Whereas operators represent
what can be carried out in parallel, goals support several se-
quential steps. I call them goals, because this is the name
that is typically used within the cognitive architecture ﬁeld,
even though our everyday use of goals is much more en-
compassing. However, we can use goals in a slightly dif-
ferent way than is traditionally done in cognitive architec-
tures. Instead of identifying goals with tasks, with the con-
sequence that knowledge is compartmentalized into separate
task units, we can also view them as ﬂexible building blocks
for tasks. As a consequence, we should consider goals as
task-general pieces of knowledge that can be instantiated in
particular situations (tasks). Learning goals is again a matter
of composition: a goal is composed of a set of operators that
carry out that goal.
Tasks
Eventually, we need all our knowledge to be able to apply it
in particular contexts, which we typically refer to as tasks.
To carry out a task, we have to select the right set of goals
and instantiate them with the particulars of the task. This
is the level of abstraction where we can perform one-shot-
learning: to carry out a task, we just need to combine a few
goals. It is, of course, only one-shot-learning if we have all
the knowledge to carry out these goals. By separating tasks
from goals, they become a muchmore ﬂexible unit of knowl-
edge than the typical goal in horizontal architectures. A task
corresponds to a small knowledge structure that can be build
on the ﬂy, and that activates all the detailed knowledge nec-
essary to carry out the task. If a particular task recurs fre-
quently, it is worthwhile to retain the task knowledge struc-
ture, but otherwise it can be forgotten to be reconstructed
when it is needed again.
Higher Levels. . .
The ability to use language provides a substantial boost in
the ability of children to carry out tasks, because they can
now receive instructions that provide top-down guidance.
The construction of a task representation is probably closely
linked to language and the semantics of language. It is no
coincidence that formal education starts at around six years,
when presumably enough of the groundwork has been laid
by play, exploration and exposition to be able to beneﬁt from
such instruction. Social cognition is typically also attributed
(at least by Newell) to higher levels. However, for me it is
not entirely clear whether language and social cognition cor-
respond to higher levels of abstraction (which would mean
they are composed of multiple tasks), or that they just per-
sist over longer periods of time (which is true for many other
types of knowledge).
Example: Rapid Instructed Task Learning
An experimental paradigm that encourages thinking in terms
of a higher level of modeling is Rapid Instructed Task Learn-
ing (RITL) (Cole et al. 2010; Cole, Laurent, and Stocco








Figure 2: Prior knowledge necessary for the RITL task. Pen-
tagons represent goals, while circles represent operators.
Some of the goals share the same operators.
instruction on every trial in the experiment. For example, in
Cole et al.’s experiments, subjects are presented with three
words that describe the task, for example SAME – SWEET
– LEFT INDEX. After a delay of a few seconds, this instruc-
tions is followed by two words to which the instruction has
to be applied, for example Grape – Apple. In this case the
instruction translates into: If the answer to ‘is it SWEET’ is
the SAME for both words, press your LEFT INDEX ﬁnger.
For each of the three words in the instruction there are four
alternatives: four logical operators, four object attributes and
four ﬁngers, creating a space of 64 possible tasks. Cole at al.
(2010) found that different brain regions are active when a
subject receives a new task than a repeated task. In our own
experiments, we found that repeated tasks are performed
(slightly) faster than new tasks.
A model of the RITL task has to be able to construct a
task representation on the ﬂy. For this, it needs a number of
goal primitives, which are displayed in Figure 2. For each of
the four logical operators (same, just-one, second, negate-
second) separate goals are present, even though these goals
share operators. To determine the particular attribute value,
a generic determine-attribute goal is used that is instantiated
with the speciﬁc attribute that is in the instruction. The same
is true for the respond-press goal that presses the instructed
ﬁnger. Finally, the model includes a setup-instruction goal
that is particular for this experiment, and that is a proxy for
a more general task-construction process. Setup-instruction
takes the three instruction words, and creates a task repre-
sentation that ties together three goals with the appropriate
instantiations. Figure 3 shows the structure it creates for the











Figure 3: Task representation that the model constructs for








Figure 4: The same (RITL) model, but now each of the white
and grey circles represents a primitive operation
If we assume all the primitives at the goal level are in
place, the simple graph in Figure 3 is the model of the task.
This task-level model is much more simple (and therefore
appropriate for the rapid changes in the RITL task) than the
operator-level model in Figure 2, or even more so if we com-
pare it to the same model, but now at the level of primitive
operations in Figure 4.
Discussion
The standard model in physics describes the elementary
units of the universe. Everything can, in theory, and includ-
ing cognition, be described by building upwards from that
model. A standard model of the mind is tougher to specify,
because it is not clear what the best level of description is.
Any proposal for a standard model, including Laird et al.
(in press), will have a hard time to justify the basic unit of
knowledge, because breaking down those units into smaller
units may be necessary for a full understanding.
The reason is that a particular choice of level of abstrac-
tion can always be criticized because assumptions have to
be made about the lower levels of representation (leading
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to parameter ﬁtting). The alternative, a multi-layer architec-
ture, can allow the modeler to choose an appropriate level
of abstraction, from which assumptions can be made about
the primitives at the lower level. But by explicating these
primitives (which are not primitives at the lower level), they
can be investigated themselves. For this to work, levels of
abstraction have to be connected together through composi-
tion. Composition mechanisms are different between levels,
ranging from slow associative learning at the lowest levels
to one-shot task model construction at the highest level.
The beneﬁt of this approach is that primitives at a certain
level can more easily be reused, potentially even between
different modelers. This requires a somewhat better speci-
ﬁcation than modelers are used to, but has great potential
rewards.
Many details still need to be investigated, and different so-
lutions are possible and should be pitted against each other,
but if the overall research program of cognitive architecture
wants to survive, it needs to leave its comfort zone and face
new tough challenges.
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